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Abstract 
We investigate how firms react to their product-market peers’ commitment to and adoption of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) using a regression discontinuity design approach. Relying 
on the passage or failure of CSR proposals by a narrow margin of votes during shareholder 
meetings, we find the passage of a close-call CSR proposal and its implementation are followed 
by the adoption of similar CSR practices by peer firms. In addition, peers that have greater 
difficulty in catching up with the voting firm in CSR experience significantly lower stock returns 
around the passage, consistent with the notion that the spillover effect of the adoption of CSR is 
a strategic response to competitive threat. Using alternative definitions of peers and examining 
underlying mechanisms, we further rule out alternative explanations such as that based on 
propagation by financial intermediaries. 
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1. Introduction 
The existence of peer effects on individual and household financial decision making and 
behavior has been well documented (e.g., Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012), Georgarakos, Haliassos, 
and Pasini (2014), Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman, and Yuchtman (2014), Bailey, Cao, Kuchler, and 
Stroebel (2016), Agarwal, Mikhed, and Schonick (2016), Agarwal, Qian, and Zou (2017)). 
Recent studies have found substantial externalities and peer effects in corporate policies as well. 
For example, according to Leary and Roberts (2014), peer effects are more important for 
determining capital structure than most previously identified determinants. Such peer effects are 
also present in corporate precautionary cash holdings (e.g., Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala 
(2014)), corporate investment decisions (e.g., Foucault and Fresard (2014), Dessaint, Foucault, 
Fresard, and Matray (2016)), dividend policies (e.g., Grennan (2018)), financial misconduct (e.g., 
Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman (2018), Kaustia and Rantala (2015)), as well as related stock 
market reactions during crucial corporate events such as acquisitions and IPOs (e.g., Servaes and 
Tamayo (2014), Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2010)).  
Despite the vast literature on peer effects in various corporate activities, an important yet 
largely unexplored aspect of such effects is its social component. The term “social component” 
refers to a firm’s engagement in activities that improve other stakeholders’ welfare, from 
investing in environmental protection to increasing workforce diversity and employee welfare. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies have been widely adopted by companies around 
the world, and more than 80% of S&P 500 companies regularly publish CSR reports. This 
movement has fundamentally changed the competitive landscape and industry structures of 
economies around the world. Despite the prevalence of CSR policies, relatively little is known 
about whether the surge in such policies is at least partially attributable to the spillover effect it 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2634100
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has on other companies and their underlying mechanisms if such CSR peer effects indeed exist. 
These are the questions we aim to address in this paper, with a focus on competing peers on the 
product market. 
Underlying our empirical investigation is the argument that a firm’s adoption of CSR 
policies can affect peer firms’ “utilities” in competition, leading the peers to respond strategically 
by adopting more CSR practices. For example, one such strategy that firms can adopt is 
environment-friendly production technology, which can create a good image and builds social 
capital toward environmentally conscious consumers (Hong and Liskovich (2016), Lins, Servaes, 
and Tamayo (2017)). Because it is expensive to develop such technology, firms may not invest 
heavily in it. However, when one firm deviates from the norm by adopting environment-friendly 
production technology, it can gain a competitive advantage over others in the product market 
(Flammer (2015a)). Consequently, its product-market peers may get “hurt” in terms of 
profitability, leading them to invest in similar environment-friendly technology in order to catch 
up. This “utility” mechanism suggests that peer firms’ adoption of CSR policies occurs as a 
strategic response to competitive threats, such that peer firms mimic the deviating firm’s CSR 
strategy. Some peer firms may also adopt a different type of CSR, that is, a differentiation 
strategy, depending on their competitive positions in the product market. Such a differentiation 
strategy may be particularly attractive for a market follower when evaluating uncertain 
investment opportunities (Smit and Trigeorgis (2006), Stoughton, Wong, and Yi (2017)), as this 
allows a firm to create its own comparative advantage and avoid direct competition with the 
market leader (Porter (1985)).   
Alternately, a firm’s CSR policy can spill over to its competing peers through managers’ 
herd behavior or propagation by financial intermediaries. Specifically, managers of peer firms 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2634100
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may have an incentive to herd out of concerns about their reputations in the labor market, 
regardless of whether doing so maximizes value for their own shareholders.1 They may also 
adopt more CSR policies if pressured by external parties such as analysts and institutional 
investors, who usually “propagate” certain practices across the firms that they cover or hold. 
Moreover, if CSR plays little role in firms’ interactions in the product market and managers 
make informed decisions for their shareholders, there may be no spillover whatsoever of the 
adoption of CSR.  
Despite the growing importance of CSR and different theoretical predictions for peer 
effects, the empirical evidence for CSR peer effects is limited. The main reason is that both CSR 
and a firm’s interactions with its peers in the product market are arguably endogenous choices 
made by the firm, which posits an empirical challenge for testing the peer effects of CSR. 
Specifically, it is unknown whether firms and investors react to their peers’ CSR policies by 
changing their own CSR practices, or whether the preexisting differences in other unobservable 
firm characteristics lead different peer firms to adopt CSR policies to different extents. It is also 
difficult to apply a typical quasi-natural experimental approach by exploring exogenous 
legislative changes, because such changes usually affect all firms’ CSR in the same industry or 
market.  
We circumvent these empirical concerns and investigate the peer effects of CSR by using 
a regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach. We compare the effects of a firm’s 
shareholder-sponsored CSR proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes (around a 50% 
                                                            
1 As argued by Scharfstein and Stein (1990), an unprofitable decision is not as bad for a manager’s reputation when 
others make the same mistake (the “sharing-the-blame” effect). Therefore, even if a manager’s private information 
suggests that investing in CSR will produce negative expected value, he may still pursue it if others have adopted 
similar strategies. Bustamante and Fresard (2017) further argue that when firms’ managers have imperfect 
information about fundamentals, they may use peers’ investment as a source of information and make similar 
investments. 
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majority threshold) in annual meetings on its product-market peer firms’ subsequent CSR 
practices.2 The passage of such close-call proposals is similar to a random assignment of CSR to 
companies and hence is not correlated with peer-firm characteristics. Conceptually, there is no 
reason to expect that the peer firms of a company that passes a CSR proposal with 51% of the 
votes are systematically different from the peer firms of a company in which a similar proposal 
fails with 49% of the votes. Therefore, close-call CSR proposals provide a source of random 
variation of a firm’s commitment to CSR that can be used to estimate the causal effect on its peer 
firms’ CSR practices.3 Although a similar approach has been used by Flammer (2015a) and by 
Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) to study the effects of the passage of CSR proposals and 
corporate governance proposals on stock returns, both of those studies examined the focal firm’s 
shareholder value rather than peer effects induced by product-market connections. Our empirical 
setting focuses on peer firms, which enables us to go beyond the focal firm’s perspective and 
study the dynamic interaction among firms. In addition, we investigate the proposals’ 
implementation utilizing different data sources, including corporate news about the actual 
adoption of CSR, to better understand the potential mechanisms.  
By empirically testing a sample of more than 3,000 U.S. public nonvoting peer firms over 
the period of 1997–2011 using the RDD approach, we find strong effects of the passage of close-
call CSR proposals on the stock market reaction and the adoption of CSR policies by the voting 
                                                            
2 The need for shareholder proposals on CSR arises from the fact that, with limited firm resources, self-interested 
managers are not always willing to voluntarily invest in CSR, even though doing so may benefit a broader group of 
stakeholders, possibly including shareholders (Flammer (2015a)). 
3 Appendix A shows two examples of voting on CSR proposals that help illustrate our empirical method. The 
example in Panel A is a case of a marginally rejected CSR proposal during the Massey Company shareholder 
meeting on 19 May 2010. The proposal on carbon dioxide emissions was rejected, with 45.6% supporting votes. The 
example in Panel B is a case of a marginally approved CSR proposal during the IDACORP, Inc., shareholder 
meeting on 21 May 2010. The proposal on reducing total greenhouse gas emissions was passed with 51.2% 
supporting votes. Our objective is to examine the difference in nonvoting peer-firm reactions. In our sample Massey 
Energy has 49 peer firms, with an average adjusted KLD score of -0.62 in the year after the vote, i.e., 2010. 
IDACORP, Inc. has 55 peers, with an average adjusted KLD score of -0.20.  
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firm, as well as subsequent adoption of CSR policies by its peer firms. Specifically, if the voting 
firm marginally passes a close-call CSR proposal, it experiences higher three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) and, subsequently, a higher CSR score. The average CSR score for its 
competing peer firms in the following year is significantly higher (30% of the standard deviation) 
than that of the competing peer firms in which the vote fails by a small margin. The effect is 
even stronger if the close-call CSR proposal was actually implemented in the subsequent year, 
suggesting that these effects go beyond pure signaling—they can materially influence peer firms. 
Using global polynomial estimations, different measures of CSR and their subscores, and 
different competing peer samples, we found these results to be robust. Such effects are absent 
from non-peer groups and for non-CSR proposals. In addition, the effects are generally 
concentrated in the same domain in which a competing voting firm passes a specific type of CSR 
proposal, though industry followers also adopt other types of CSR to some extent.  
In exploring the channels through which CSR peer effects are transmitted, we find little 
evidence that they are driven by financial intermediaries’ propagation, as such effects are absent 
from peer firms, defined by common analyst coverage or common institutional investors. 
Similarly, we do not find significant differences between two subsamples of product-market 
peers with and without common analysts or common institutional owners with the voting firm. 
Instead, the peer effects of CSR policies are concentrated in a subsample where the competitive 
pressure between voting firm and peer firms is relatively strong, suggesting a channel through 
which competitive pressure is exerted.  
In order to better understand the underlying mechanism, we further investigate peer firms’ 
stock market reaction to the passage of a CSR proposal. The passage of a CSR proposal should 
be bad news to competing peers if the voting firm’s CSR policy forms a competitive threat to 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2634100
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these peers. We find significantly lower three-day CARs for product-market peers around the 
passage of a close-call CSR proposal. Such negative CARs are more significant in firms with 
greater financial constraints and more competitive pressures when the voting firm’s CSR 
proposal is more likely to be implemented (based on ex ante  recommendations by the board), 
and when the gap in CSR between voting and peer firms widens after the vote. Our empirical 
results confirm that the unfavorable market reaction comes mainly from those who have greater 
difficulty catching up in CSR; furthermore, they lend additional support to the competition-based 
explanation, that CSR can enhance a firm’s value by creating a competitive advantage.  
Two guideposts can be used to put our findings into context in the literature. First, our 
work contributes to understanding peer effects in economic activity. The extant literature has 
documented substantial peer effects on corporate behavior, such as firms reacting to their peers’ 
financial policies by adjusting their capital structure (Leary and Roberts (2014)) and reducing 
cash holdings and capital expenditure while increasing dividend payout and adopting more anti-
takeover devices following hostile takeover threats in their industries (Servaes and Tamayo 
(2014)). What is theoretically less clear is whether and how a firm’s social engagement can also 
spill over to other firms. Because it is an increasingly important aspect of corporate behavior, 
CSR provides us with an ideal foundation from which to test a different facet of peer effects—
one that is related to social engagement—as well as its implications for financial performance. 
Our results show that the peer effects of CSR policies are a strategic response that relieves the 
competitive threats resulting from the voting firm’s CSR policy.  
Secondly, our work contributes to the understanding of why firms participate in CSR, 
which has increasingly become a mainstream business activity despite standard economic 
theories that predict the practice should be rather uncommon (Bénabou and Tirole (2010), 
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Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012)). The neoclassical economic paradigm usually considers 
these CSR activities to be unnecessary and inconsistent with profit maximization (e.g., Friedman 
(1970)). The extant literature usually explains the determinants of CSR from a company’s own 
perspective by investigating how a firm’s decision to participate in CSR is motived by financial 
conditions (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman (2012)), strategic and reputational concerns 
(Hong and Liskovich (2016)), shareholder engagement (Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2015)), and 
agency problems (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2016), Masulis and 
Reza (2015)). Others have investigated the inverse, namely, the effects of CSR on corporate 
policies and performance (Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000), Edmans (2011), Deng, Kang, and 
Low (2013), Flammer (2015a)) and the cost of capital (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra 
(2011), Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang (2011), Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2017)). 
Some recent studies have shown that CSR is not merely driven by a firm’s own characteristics 
but to a greater extent is determined by external factors such as the legal and economic 
environment (e.g., Liang and Renneboog (2017a, 2017b)). Our work extends the scope of this 
literature by documenting that a firm’s CSR policy and financial performance can also be 
substantially changed by its peers’ practices in the pursuit of competitive advantage, suggesting 
that the adoption of CSR policies is value-enhancing.  
 
2. Data and Empirical Strategy  
2.1. Data, Measurement, and Sample Construction 
As previously mentioned, we rely on a regression discontinuity design approach as the key 
identification strategy and investigate the effect of the close-call passage of a firm’s CSR 
proposal on its nonvoting peers’ subsequent CSR performance. We obtain the data on 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2634100
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shareholder-proposal voting results from RiskMetrics and Factset’s SharkRepellent. The 
RiskMetrics data covers shareholder proposals from 1997 to 2011 for all 1,500 S&P companies 
and an additional 400–500 widely held companies. The resolution type “SRI” in RiskMetrics 
identifies the proposals related to CSR. For each proposal, the data set provides the date of the 
annual meeting, the proposal’s sponsor, the voting requirements, and the vote outcome. We 
supplement the voting data from RiskMetrics with data from SharkRepellent, which covers about 
4,000 companies in the Russell 3,000 index from 2005 to 2011. The SharkRepellent proposals 
related to CSR are categorized as “Social/Environmental Issues.” We then cross-validate these 
proposals with the ISS Voting Outcomes data. 
To identify peer effects, we construct a sample of competing peers using the Hoberg-
Phillips industry classification based on firm pairwise similarity scores from textual analyses of 
firm 10-K product descriptions.4 This approach essentially identifies peer firms according to the 
similarity of their products, which better captures the competitive relationship between peer 
firms and also matches the product-centric nature of CSR and the fact that CSR usually spans 
multiple industries, a point that may not be properly captured by industry-based peer definitions. 
This peer (product-market rivals) database covers the fiscal years 1996–2011. In each fiscal year, 
two firms are recorded as a pair of rivals if they exhibit a degree of product similarity according 
to the product descriptions in their 10-K files. Our identification of product-market peers is based 
on ex ante information—that is, the fiscal year in which the product-market competitors from the 
Hoberg-Philips database are retrieved is the year before the actual event. After linking the 
shareholder proposal data with the Hoberg-Phillips peer-firm database, we require no missing 
outcome variables (discussed in the next paragraph) or relevant firm fundamental variables (size, 
                                                            
4 The text-based product-market peer data can be obtained from http://cwis.usc.edu/projects/industrydata/. Refer to 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) for detailed descriptions.  
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market-to-book, and leverage). When we later investigate the stock market reaction, we also 
remove peer firms that have experienced stock and bond issuance, mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) announcements, and dividend payments around their affiliated voting firm’s voting date 
(Day -5 to Day 5) to rule out potential confounding effects.5 This filtering procedure leads to a 
final competing peer-firm sample of 38,630 (nonvoting peer-) firm vote observations, 
corresponding to 3,452 unique nonvoting U.S. public firms associated with 1,407 unique firm 
votes from 1997 to 2011.6 In our robustness tests, we also use the standard three-digit SIC 
definitions of industry peers. Appendix C provides the distribution of our sample, with Panel A 
showing a summary of the numbers of voting firm vote observations and nonvoting competing 
peer-vote observations in each year, as well as the cumulative percentage, and Panel B showing 
the distribution of CSR proposals by type, which are classified according to the general 
categories (dimensions) as used in KLD.  
To test nonvoting peers’ reaction to the passage of a CSR proposal in the voting firm, we 
retrieve the data from the MSCI ESG STATS database (formerly known as the Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database), which are the most comprehensive CSR scores used in 
the literature (e.g., Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2009), Hong and Liskovich (2016), Flammer 
(2015a, 2015b), Cronqvist and Yu (2017), Lins et al. (2017)). Developed by a for-profit 
company, KLD scores are similar to credit ratings. The scores measure firm-level CSR along the 
lines of community relations, product characteristics, environmental impact, employee relations, 
workforce diversity, and corporate governance. KLD scans public databases such as those that 
                                                            
5 Our stock and bond issuance data comes from the SDC database. The M&A announcement data are obtained from 
the Zephyr and SDC databases. Dividend payment data are obtained from the CRSP.  
6 Our sample has fewer votes than Flammer (2015a) because the data coverage of the Hoberg-Phillips database is 
smaller than that of the Compustat universe. Nevertheless, as we show later, our results are robust to different peer 
definitions, such as the SIC industry classification, which includes broader coverage in Compustat. 
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have experienced employee strikes and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) violations and 
uses a team of analysts to measure these and other social-responsibility dimensions of firm 
production. We mainly rely on the CSR score of the nonvoting firms in the year t+1 (the year 
after their peers’ vote) as the outcome variable. The MSCI ESG STATS (KLD) database 
provides detailed information on firms’ CSR activities according to 13 categories: community, 
diversity, employment, environment, human rights, product, alcohol, gaming, firearms, military, 
nuclear, tobacco, and corporate governance. Within each category, the database shows whether 
the firm has performed a benefit (“Strength”) or effected a harm (“Concern”) and awards one 
point for each relevant activity. The CSR score is calculated as Strengths minus Concerns. To 
measure the overall CSR performance of a firm, we consider four main CSR categories (or 
dimensions) as classified by KLD: community, diversity, employee relations, and environment.7  
Following Deng et al. (2013) and Servaes and Tamayo (2013), we count the number of 
strengths and concerns within each of the four categories and subtract the number of concerns 
from the number of strengths to construct the raw score for each category in each year. The 
overall raw CSR score is the sum of the raw scores of the four categories. A higher raw CSR 
score indicates a better CSR performance. However, as Manescu (2011) points out, the raw CSR 
score may not be helpful in evaluating a firm’s actual CSR activities over the years, because the 
number of strengths and concerns within each category can differ. To overcome this concern and 
obtain consistent comparisons in both the cross-section and time-series analyses, we scale the 
strengths and concerns for each firm-year to a range of 0 to 1. To do so, we divide the number of 
strengths (or concerns) for each firm-year within each CSR category by the maximum possible 
                                                            
7 We exclude corporate governance from our CSR performance construction because it is perceived as a mechanism 
for mitigating conflict between principles and managers (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) rather than a concern about 
other stakeholders, such as the community and employees. We also exclude the dimension of product safety and 
quality, because it is more likely to be subject to legal restrictions and regulations and because it is hardwired into 
product-market competition, which may obscure the interpretation of our results based on product-market peers. 
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number of strengths (or concerns) in each CSR category each year to get the adjusted strength (or 
concern) index. We then subtract the adjusted concern index from the adjusted strength index. 
For each category, the adjusted CSR score ranges from year -1 to year +1. For the overall 
adjusted CSR score, we sum the four adjusted scores. Therefore, in principle, the adjusted CSR 
score can range from -4 to +4. We use the raw CSR score and the change in the adjusted CSR 
performance score as alternative outcome variables for a robustness check. In robustness tests, 
we also collected information on the actual implementation of the passed CSR proposals and test 
it using the ASSET4 US ESG ratings, an alternative data source on firm-level CSR practices. 
The definitions and sources of our variables are provided in Appendix B. The summary 
statistics of our key outcome variables and control variables are provided in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
2.2. Methodology  
We use a regression discontinuity framework to estimate the causal effect of shareholder 
proposals on peer firms’ future CSR engagement and other outcome variables.8 Like Flammer 
(2015a), we use a voting firm’s random passage of CSR proposals for identification, but we 
focus on the CSR practices of the nonvoting peer firms instead of that of the voting firm. Ideally, 
to obtain a consistent estimate, we would want the passage of a CSR proposal to be a randomly 
assigned variable with regard to peer firms’ characteristics, especially the firms’ CSR 
performance. The RDD framework that exploits the vote shares helps us to approximate this 
ideal setup, because the passage of a CSR proposal is a random outcome in an arbitrarily small 
interval around the majority vote threshold (50%); for example, whether a proposal passes by 51% 
                                                            
8 Several papers have used the regression discontinuity design, including Cuñat et al. (2012), Flammer (2015a), and 
Bradley, Kim, and Tian (2017).  
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or by 49% is arguably random. These close-call CSR proposals therefore provide a source of 
random variation in commitment to CSR that can be used to estimate the causal effect of passing 
a CSR proposal on peer firms’ performance. Our estimate of the effect using RDD is not affected 
by omitted variables, even if the variables are correlated with the vote, as long as the effects are 
continuous around the threshold. 
We perform the RDD by using a nonparametric, “local” linear estimation. Small 
“neighborhoods” on the left- and right-hand sides of the threshold are used to estimate 
discontinuities in peer firms’ reactions. We follow Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) to derive 
the asymptotically optimal bandwidth under a squared-error loss. The choices of the 
neighborhoods (bandwidth) are data driven (determined by the data structure) and different 
across samples and variables. By choosing the optimal bandwidth to the left and right of the 
cutoff point (threshold), we are able to use the nonparametric linear estimation approach to 
capture the difference in future CSR performance between peers with respect to the passage and 
failure of a CSR proposal by their associated voting firm. In addition, the RDD requires no other 
observable covariates (control variables) for identification. The local linear regression model can 
therefore be specified as: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,                                   (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the CSR score in year t+1 of the peer firm i; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a dummy equal to 1 if 
the peer firm’s associated voting firm passes a CSR-related proposal—that is, if more than 50% 
of the votes are in favor of adopting the CSR proposal—and 0 otherwise; and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the 
percentage of vote shares favoring the CSR proposal, centered at the 50% threshold. The 
estimate of 𝜌𝜌 captures the discontinuity at the majority threshold—the difference in outcome 
between the peer firms of voting firms that marginally pass a CSR proposal and the peer firms of 
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voting firms that marginally reject a CSR proposal—and hence provides a consistent estimate of 
the causal effect of passing a CSR proposal on peer firms’ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . We also use alternative 
bandwidths that are either narrower or wider than the optimal bandwidth to check the sensitivity 
of our results. 
 
2.3. Tests for a Quasi-Randomized Assignment 
Our identification strategy requires that passing or rejecting a close-call CSR proposal be nearly 
random with respect to peer-firm characteristics. In this subsection, we perform two diagnostic 
tests for the RDD validity of the identifying assumption (randomness assumption) that 
shareholders of the voting company cannot precisely manipulate the forcing variable (i.e., vote 
shares) near the known cutoff (Lee and Lemieux (2010)). If this assumption is satisfied, the 
variation in the passage of CSR proposals should be as good as that from a randomized 
experiment. 
 
2.3.1. Continuity in the Distribution of Shareholder Votes 
We first test whether the distribution of shareholder votes is continuous around the majority 
threshold, that is, 50% of vote shares. We follow McCrary (2008) and provide a formal test of 
the discontinuity in the density, which checks for the smoothness of the density function around 
the threshold. A random assignment of pass-versus-fail at a narrow margin implies that the 
distribution of vote shares should be smooth and continuous around the majority threshold. 
Appendix D.1 visually confirms this. A more formal test is provided in Appendix D.2, which 
plots the density of shareholder votes. The dots depict the density and the solid line, the 
percentage of votes for CSR. The density appears generally smooth, with no evidence of a 
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discontinuous jump around the threshold. The p-value is 0.1556, which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of continuity of the density function at the threshold. We are able to confirm, in 
accordance with McCrary’s (2008) test result, that no precise manipulation exists and that the 
assumption of smoothness is validated. 
 
2.3.2. Preexisting Differences 
The randomness assumption of our RDD setting also requires that the peer firms of companies 
whose voting shares are marginally below or above the majority threshold should be very similar 
on the basis of ex ante characteristics. In other words, if the passage of close-call CSR proposals 
is close to a random assignment, it should be unrelated to peer-firm characteristics prior to the 
vote. There is little reason to believe that such a voting outcome is directly affected by peer-firm 
characteristics. To justify this, we show in Table 2 the differences of a few key firm-
characteristic variables for these two peer groups (hereafter called “passing peers” and “failing 
peers,” which refer to peer firms of the voting firm that passes a close-call CSR proposal and 
those of the voting firm that fails a close-call CSR proposal, respectively). As shown in columns 
(1) and (2), before voting on CSR proposals, the firm’s characteristics—size, market-to-book 
ratio, book leverage, return on assets (ROA), and CSR scores—of passing peers and failing peers 
are not very different. In column (3), the differences between passing peers and failing peers in 
general are statistically significant for firm size and market-to-book ratio, but such significance 
completely disappears in column (4), in which we compare the differences at the narrow margin 
around the threshold.9 Overall, this evidence suggests that no systematic or significant difference 
                                                            
9 We conduct the tests using optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The number of 
observations varies across different variables because the optimal bandwidths are different. Our results do not 
change when we test the preexisting difference within some other specified small margins such as [48%, 52%] or 
[49%, 51%]. 
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exists between passing peers and failing peers around the majority threshold, which lends 
support to our identification strategy. More pre-existing differences tests can be found in Online 
Appendix E. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3. Results  
3.1. First-Stage Results of the Voting Firm 
Having validated the randomness assumption of our RDD setting, we first show the results for 
the first-stage of the CSR peer effects, namely the reaction of the voting firm itself upon the 
passage of its close-call CSR proposal. We replicate Flammer’s (2015a) tests and report the 
results in Panel A of Table 3. We find that the voting firms whose close-call CSR proposals are 
marginally passed experience positive CARs. The economic magnitude for a voting firm’s CAR 
is 1.02%, slightly smaller than Flammer’s (2015a) result of 1.77%. This may be due to the fact 
that our sample firms on average are larger than Flammer’s (2015a). 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the probability of all passed proposals’ being implemented in 
the following year, based on several criteria.10 On average, the implementation rate for all CSR 
proposals is around 60%. This is comparable with Flammer (2015a), who finds that 52% of the 
passing firms implemented the CSR proposal. Overall, the results in Table 3 confirm that the 
passage of a CSR proposal indeed has a sizable effect on the voting firm’s own stock market 
performance and subsequent CSR adoption, which will likely create a competitive threat to its 
product-market peers.  
                                                            
10 We define implementation according to three criteria. First of all, we define the implementation of an increase in 
adjusted CSR score from MSCI ESG STATS (formerly KLD database). For each dimension, implementation is 
defined as an increase in related CSR dimensions. Secondly, implementation is defined as the increase in Asset4 
score. Finally, we manually checked the news for passed CSR proposals and define implementation as (1) there is 
news report about the proposal implementation; or (2) there is a news report on the corporate website; or (3) the 
management team voted ‘FOR’ before the votes. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
3.2. The Effects of CSR Commitment on Peer Firms’ Following-Year CSR Levels 
We then formally test the effect of the voting firm’s passage or rejection of a close-call CSR 
proposal on peer firms’ subsequent-year CSR levels (using KLD scores). As previously 
mentioned, we start with competing peers based on the Hoberg-Phillips classification and report 
the results of our baseline specifications (Eq. (1)). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Panel A of Table 4 estimates the difference in CSR commitment between passing peers 
and failing peers, as previously defined, with different bandwidths and with rectangular as well 
as triangular kernels.11 It clearly shows that the estimates are positive and statistically significant 
above the 5% level across different specifications of bandwidth and kernel. The point estimate is 
approximately 0.16 under the data-driven optimal bandwidth (as in column (1)), indicating that 
the difference in CSR levels between passing peers and failing peers is as large as 0.16 point. 
Given that the adjusted KLD score has a mean of -0.13 and a standard deviation of 0.42, a 
difference of 0.16 should be economically sizable. The results remain significant when we use 50% 
and 150% of the optional bandwidth, as shown in columns (2) and (3). When we replace the 
adjusted KLD score with the change in adjusted KLD score from year t-1 to year t+1 and 
estimate using optimal bandwidth, we obtain quantitatively similar results (column (4)). 
Although all of these results are estimated using the rectangular kernel, a very similar result is 
                                                            
11 For these baseline specifications, we test the discontinuity at the majority threshold—i.e., 50%. For placebo tests, 
we conduct the same analysis at other cutoffs (e.g., 45%, 35%, 55%, 65%, etc.); we find no evidence of 
discontinuity for the subsequent CSR activities, which supports our argument that the effects on peer firms’ CARs 
are generated by the exogenous increase of the CSR level of the voting firm caused by marginally passing the CSR 
proposal.  
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obtained when the difference in KLD scores is estimated using the triangular kernel, as in 
column (5).12 These results imply that when a voting firm marginally passes a CSR proposal, its 
peer firms’ CSR practices in the following year improve significantly. In other words, peer firms 
follow their competitors’ potential adoption of CSR proposals by engaging more in their own 
CSR, possibly because of competitive pressure created by the voting firms. 
In Panel B we conduct a similar RDD test using a different methodology to capture the 
discontinuity. Instead of relying only on the observations within the optimal bandwidths, we 
extend the regression discontinuity analysis with an estimation of a global polynomial series 
model by including polynomials of order three on both sides of the threshold.13 Specifically, we 
estimate the following model: 
           𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙) + 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟) +  𝜑𝜑Ƶ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,                     (2) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the outcome variable of the (nonvoting) peer firm—that is, an adjusted KLD score in 
year t+1; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a dummy that equals 1 if the voting firm passes the CSR proposal—that is, if 
the vote percentage is higher than 50% and 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙) is a flexible polynomial 
function for observations on the left-hand side of the majority threshold 𝛾𝛾 (50% in our case) with 
different orders; 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟) is a flexible polynomial function for observations on the right-hand 
side of the threshold 𝛾𝛾 with different orders; and 𝑣𝑣 is the percentage of shares favoring the CSR 
proposal. We choose a polynomial order of 3 for our analysis. Ƶ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a set of control variables. 
The estimate of 𝛽𝛽 is the variable of interest, and the magnitude shows the difference in 
these two smoothed functions at the cutoff, thereby capturing the effects of passing a CSR 
                                                            
12 According to Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the choice of kernel has little impact on the estimation in practice, 
though using a rectangular kernel is more common.  
13 The global polynomial approach, however, fails to take into consideration RDD’s strong locality and weak 
externality, which are important features of the approach (Bakke and Whited (2012)).  
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proposal on nonvoting peers’ subsequent CSR performance. As shown in Panel B, the estimates 
of 𝛽𝛽  are significantly positive both without column (1) and with column (2) controls, with 
economic magnitudes similar to those in Panel A, thus further confirming our baseline results. 
 
3.3. Passage versus Implementation 
The above results demonstrate that peer firms in a competitive relationship follow the voting 
firms’ potential CSR adoption and go on to improve their own CSR practices. However, it is 
possible that some of the proposals that passed were not implemented (because the voting results 
are nonbinding), and some CSR practices were carried out without a proposal’s being passed. 
Therefore, the above results can also be interpreted as showing that the passage of a CSR 
proposal may at least credibly signal a firm’s commitment to CSR. We conduct a fuzzy RDD 
analysis to overcome the imperfect compliance issue and disentangle the effect of signaling and 
actual adoption.  
Given the lack of pertinent data, we make use of several resources to determine whether 
the proposals were implemented. First, following Flammer (2015a), we define implementation 
based on the change of KLD score (adjusted for the overall number) after the vote. Specifically, 
if the adjusted KLD score increased in the year after the vote, we interpret it as suggestive that 
the proposal was implemented.14 Second, we define implementation based on another CSR data 
source, ASSET4, as an external validity check. Like KLD data, ASSET4 provides a firm’s 
engagement in several environmental and social issues, and we focus on its aggregate 
environmental and social scores. However, unlike KLD data, the ASSET4 scores for each 
dimension range from 0 to 100, with a median of 50. We define an increase of 10 of a firm’s 
ASSET4 score (the standard deviation of the distribution within an industry) one year after the 
                                                            
14 The rule also applies to firms that rejected a CSR proposal.  
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passage of a close-call CSR proposal as an indication that the proposal was likely to be 
implemented. Third, we manually collect data on the actual implementation of those passed CSR 
proposals. To do so, we extensively searched various sources including the corporate website, 
10-K filing, third-party websites that follow corporate social responsibility issues or proxy votes, 
and also the news through Google search. We specifically focus on the subsample of those 
passed proposals and consider that a proposal was passed and implemented if (a) there was a 
clear indication of a change in corporate behavior, such as a new report responding to the 
proposal of the shareholders in the year after the vote; (b) there was a corporate action, according 
to the news after the vote; or (c) the board of directors recommended a “FOR” before the vote. 
We then apply a fuzzy RDD approach to estimate CSR peer effects and use the three 
methods described above to define the implementation of CSR. The first step of fuzzy RDD is to 
estimate the probability of implementation at the cutoff, which is 50%. The results are given in 
Table 5. The first stage of the fuzzy RDD shows that the 50% cutoff has a significant impact on 
the probability of implementation. This probability increased by 10% (Panel A) if the voting 
percentage surpassed 50%. The probability of proposal implementation increases even more in 
other cases. If there is a significant jump in the probability of implementation, we run the second 
stage to obtain the estimate, adjusting for imperfect compliance. As reported in Table 5, the 
second-stage results are all significant and positive, with even larger economic magnitudes than 
the coefficients in Table 4. The results suggest that the effects we have documented are robust 
after adjusting for the probability of implementation.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The question naturally arises of whether an implemented proposal has a greater impact on 
the peer firms than one that is not implemented. Unpacking this question will give us some hints 
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as to whether the effect documented above is a pure signaling effect or has material meaning and 
impact. To answer it, we focus on all the passed proposals and then compare the responses of 
peers, conditional on whether the focal firm implemented the proposal or not. The results are 
tabulated in Table 6, in which we find that the change in such peer firms’ CSR performance is 
much stronger in the subsample of implemented proposals than in the subsample in which 
proposals went unimplemented. For example, the first two columns show a 0.17 increase of 
adjusted KLD score in peer firms whose related voting firms complied with the passed proposal. 
Yet the change in adjusted KLD score is much lower in peer firms whose related voting firms 
did not comply with the passed proposal. The difference of 0.07 is significant at a level of 10%. 
The results hold and are even stronger for the other compliance measures. This again suggests 
that the passage of a CSR proposal is not purely a matter of signaling, and its implementation can 
generate significant CSR peer effects.  
As a caveat, we only searched for implementation news regarding the passed proposals. 
As long as the probability of implementation in the just-failing sample is not zero, then the first-
stage estimate would be biased upward and the second-stage estimate would be biased 
downward. However, given the robustness of our results across the board, we don’t think such 
biases will significantly change our conclusion.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
3.4. Which CSR Matters?  
So far we have documented an overall increase in CSR performance of nonvoting peer firms 
after observing the passage of a CSR proposal. A natural question at this point is: how do peer 
firms specifically respond to the adoption of CSR policies? Do they more proactively engage in 
CSR by launching more initiatives, or do they simply comply with regulations by reducing their 
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production of negative societal externalities? To answer this question, we break down the overall 
KLD score into “strengths” and “concerns” for each KLD dimension. Items defined as strengths 
capture a firm’s voluntary engagement in CSR issues, whereas concerns capture (potential) 
negative externalities produced by the firm. For example, in the “environment” category, 
strengths include environmentally beneficial products and services (that promote the efficient use 
of energy), pollution prevention, recycling, clean energy, communication on environmental 
issues (e.g., a signatory to the CERES Principles, a notably substantive environmental report, an 
effective internal communications system for environmental best practices, etc.), as well as 
property, plans, and equipment that have an above-average environment performance. Concerns 
in this category include hazardous waste, regulatory problems, ozone-depleting chemicals, 
substantial emissions, agricultural chemicals, and climate change (substantial revenues from the 
sale of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products).15  
We conduct the same tests on peers’ following-year CSR as before, except that we replace 
the adjusted KLD score with KLD strengths and concerns. As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the 
RDD estimate of strengths is statistically significant at a level of 5%, while the estimate of 
concerns is insignificant. This may imply that the effects on the change of passing peers’ CSR 
seem to come from their focus on strengths (launching new initiatives aimed at strengthening 
firms’ social engagement) rather than on concerns (reducing negative externalities).  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Another, related question is whether the adoption of peer firms’ follow-up CSR is a 
mimicking strategy or a differentiation strategy. In other words, do peer firms adopt CSR 
                                                            
15 For a detailed description of strengths and concerns in each category, please refer to 
https://wrdsweb.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/_070KLD/_001Genera
l/_002Rating%20Criteria%20Definitions.pdf.cfm.  
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practices similar to the voting firm’s marginally passed proposal (mimicking), or do they adopt a 
different type of CSR so as to avoid direct competition (i.e., differentiation)? As mentioned in 
our theoretical framework, peer firms may adopt different strategies depending on their position 
in the product market (i.e., whether they are market leaders or followers). To test these, we 
further break down the voting firms’ CSR proposals into different types by classifying the 
proposals as environment-related proposals, workforce diversity–related proposals, or proposals 
related to employee relationships, since these are the most important aspects of CSR and cover 
most firms. We then break down the overall adjusted KLD score into a few subdimensions, such 
as environment, employee relations, and workforce diversity, to match the proposal type and 
analyze these subsamples with respect to different types of CSR proposals.16  
For reasons of brevity, we report only the results of the passage of an environment-
related proposal on peer firms’ CSR, as we delineate in the theoretical framework. As shown in 
Panel B of Table 7, we indeed find evidence that peer firms match the voting firm’s specific CSR 
strategies. The difference in the environmental score between passing and failing peers is 
significant and has the greatest magnitude of all subdimensional CSR scores, supporting the 
mimicking hypothesis.17 We also observe some evidence of differentiation: for example, the 
passage of an environment-related proposal also relates to an increase in peer firms’ diversity 
score, although the magnitude of the increase is much smaller. This can be interpreted as peer 
                                                            
16 In addition to the environment dimension, as explained in the text, the employee-relations dimension considers 
company engagement in treating a unionized workforce fairly, maintaining a consistent no-layoff policy, 
implementing a cash profit-sharing program, employee stock-option plans, retirement benefits, health and safety 
programs, and so forth. The workforce-diversity dimension considers whether a company engages in promoting a 
female or minority CEO and board of directors; provides childcare, elder care, or flexible time; contracts with 
women and minorities; develops innovative hiring programs for the disabled; puts into place progressive policies 
regarding gay and lesbian employees; and so forth.  
17 In unreported results on peer firms associated with proposals related to workforce diversity, the reaction to the 
diversity dimension is the strongest. Similarly, in a subsample that includes only proposals related to employee 
relations, only the estimate of the employee relationship score is significant—that is, peer firms significantly 
improve their engagement only in issues related to employee relations. 
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firms adopting a mimicking strategy, which appears to be economically more important than a 
differentiating strategy.  
Moreover, based on our argument, peer firms that are industry followers will be more 
likely to adopt a differentiating strategy, besides mimicking the voting firm’s specific CSR 
practice. We define industry followers and leaders based on their product-market shares (using 
sales revenue), profitability (ROA), and the CSR score (using the environmental score as an 
example) prior to the vote, all relative to the voting firm. For example, if a peer firm’s 
environmental score is lower than that of its voting firm, it is considered a follower; otherwise, it 
is considered a leader. We then test the “differentiating strategy” conjecture by performing the 
RDD tests on non-voting peers’ following-year workforce diversity score following the passage 
of a close-call environment-related proposal conditional on whether the peer firm is an industry 
follower or a leader. As shown in Panel C of Table 7, the differentiation effects show up only in 
the subsamples of industry followers based on all three criteria. This is consistent with our 
theoretical arguments and the conjectures by the industrial organization literature. 
 
3.5. Disentangling the Mechanisms of CSR Peer Effects 
Our theoretical arguments are based on the idea that a firm’s CSR practices create competitive 
pressure on its peer firms, which triggers the CSR peer effects we have documented. However, as 
mentioned earlier, an alternative explanation of the results detailed above may be that the 
spillover of CSR among product-market peers is propagated by financial intermediaries. If the 
peer effects of CSR are driven by financial intermediaries’ propagation, we should expect similar 
reactions from peers without any economic links—for example, peer firms covered by a common 
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financial analyst or held by the common institutions. The external forces may “propagate” CSR, 
though the voting firm’s CSR strategy has little impact on the utility of the peer firms.  
We investigate the propagation explanation in Panel A of Table 8 by conducting an 
analysis similar to that we did in Table 4, comparing CSR scores of passing and failing peers, but 
we use alternative definitions of peer firms based on whether they are covered by common 
analysts or held by common institutional investors. That is, a firm is considered a peer of the 
voting firm if these two firms have at least one analyst who is the same or the same institutional 
investor. This alternative definition also helps shed light on the mechanisms of peer effects. 
However, the RDD results for peers based on common analysts and common institutional 
investors, as shown in columns (1) and (2), are all insignificant, indicating that even in firms 
with a higher influence of financial intermediaries’ propagation, the peer effects of CSR are 
absent. Propagation, therefore, is unlikely to be the driving force for CSR peer effects. 
To cross-validate the results in Panel A, we also divide our sample of product-market 
peers (using the Hoberg-Phillips classification) into two subsamples based on whether the peer 
firm and the voting firm are covered by a common analyst or held by the same institutional 
investor. As shown in Panel B, we again fail to find statistically and economically significant 
differences between the subsamples. Combining all these results in Panels A and B with our 
earlier results based on product-market peers, we see that CSR peer effects are mostly driven by 
competitive pressure and are absent in those without competitive relationships, although these 
are more likely to induce propagation by financial intermediaries (common analysts and common 
institutional investors).  
If competitive pressure is driving CSR peer effects, peer firms’ responses should be 
stronger when they are in a more competitive relationship with the voting firm. To test this 
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hypothesis, we define competitive pressure, which captures the similarity of two competing firms’ 
products by measuring changes in the competing firms’ products relative to the focal firm’s 
products (Hoberg et al. (2014)). This competitive-pressure variable is constructed according to 
the way in which competitors change the wording used to describe the product, which overlaps 
with the focal firm’s vocabulary of the product description section in the 10-Ks.  
When a firm’s products are more similar to those of its peers, the competitive pressures 
among its peers is greater; thus, peer firms may have a stronger desire to mimic their competitors’ 
commitment to CSR.18 Specifically, we divide the peer firms into two groups according to their 
associated voting firms’ competitive pressure level in the year before the vote. A high-
competitive-pressure group includes peers of the voting firms whose competitive-pressure scores 
are higher than those of the sample median among all voting firms. We expect that peer firms in 
the high-competitive-pressure group are subject to more pressures than those in the low-
competitive-pressure group. The results of this competitive-pressure measure are reported in 
Panel C of Table 8. Consistent with the above conjecture, we find that the CSR peer effect is 
present mainly in the high-competitive-pressure group—namely, peer firms whose products are 
similar to their competing voting firms’ products and thus face greater pressure to engage in CSR.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
3.6. Robustness 
In addition to using a global polynomial approach and adjusting for imperfect compliance issues, 
we conduct a few robustness tests with alternative peer samples and placebo tests. First, we 
                                                            
18 We do not use a traditional HHI measure or market share because peers are identified by the product rather than 
by a specified industry. Instead, we use a measure called Fluidity, which is obtained from 10-K files and compiled 
by Hoberg et al. (2014), that shows the competitive dynamics between a firm and its peers identified through a text-
based analysis, to measure competitive pressure. More detailed description of this variable can be found in 
Appendix B “Variable Definitions.” 
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replace CSR proposals with (probable) actual CSR practices. To do so, we manually collected 
data from Factiva and an online news search on a peer firm’s actual environmental initiatives, 
such as developing an environmental R&D project.19 We then verified these news data with data 
from the ASSET4 US dataset. The overlapped part (when the company actually adopted a certain 
CSR practice as reported by the news and when this information is adjusted in ASSET4’s raw 
data) forms our sample for testing the actual CSR practices of peer firms. With these data we 
conduct the same RDD tests, and our results remain. 
Secondly, we redefine our peer firms according to (1) the standard three-digit SIC 
industry classification, and (2) a randomly selected sample with 50 arbitrarily chosen peers from 
a voting firm’s peer pool.20 Consistent with evidence according to the Hoberg-Phillips definition, 
we find similar results in these alternative peer groups.   
Thirdly, we conduct two placebo tests to ensure that the documented evidence reflects the 
peers’ response to CSR proposals and to rule out potential confounding effects. We first replace 
the competing peers with similar non-peer firms,21 and from this we find that the differences 
between passing non-peers’ and failing non-peers’ adjusted KLD scores are not statistically 
                                                            
19 In particular, we focus on (1) whether the company reported on its impact on biodiversity, on activities to reduce 
its impact on native ecosystems and species, and on the biodiversity of protected and sensitive areas (Report on 
biodiversity impact: Yes or No); (2) whether the company took any initiative to restore or protect native ecosystems 
or the biodiversity of protected and sensitive areas (Restoring ecosystems: Yes or No); (3) whether the company 
report made proactive environmental investments or expenditures (Environmental investment initiative: Yes or No); 
(4) whether it had been reported in the news that the company invested in R&D on new environmentally friendly 
products or services intended to limit the amounts of emissions and resources needed during product use (Yes or 
No); (5) whether the company invested in R&D on new environmentally friendly products (Environmental R&Ds: 
Yes or No); (6) whether the company trained its employees on environmental issues (Environmental training on 
employees: Yes or No). We further supplement the news information with two ratings from ASSET4’s 
Environmental R&D Score and Renewable/Clean Energy Products Score, both of which range from 0 to 100. 
20 This is because we notice that the number of competing peers (based on the Hoberg-Phillips definition) in our 
sample differs significantly across different voting firms—from 1 to 272. To address the concern that our results 
might be biased owing to an imbalance in the distribution of peer firms, we conduct similar tests on samples with a 
predetermined number of peer firms. In unreported tables, we also randomly select 20, 30, or 40 peers. The results 
are consistent and are available upon request.  
21 To do so, we replace each nonvoting peer with one matched firm by requiring the two firms to be the same in size, 
market-to-book ratio, and leverage ratio decile. If more than one non-peer firm is found, we keep the one closest in 
size to the peer firm. 
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significant and that the point estimates are much smaller. This indicates that a voting firm’s 
potential adoption of CSR does not affect non-peer firms, and the observed differences in peer 
firms’ CSR are induced by the voting firm’s CSR strategy rather than by other confounding 
factors. In addition, we purify the CSR votes by excluding the events if there is a vote on a 
corporate governance proposal on the same day in the annual meeting. We find that the estimated 
difference in CSR remains statistically significant, indicating that our previous findings were not 
entirely driven by confounding proposals regarding corporate governance. These results are 
reported in Online Appendix F.  
 
4. The Value Implications of CSR Peer Effects 
The findings above suggest the existence of strong CSR peer effects. As a final step, we study 
the value implications of such peer effects by examining the peer firms’ stock market reactions 
to the voting firms’ passage of close-call CSR proposals. If the passage of a CSR proposal by 
voting firms forms a competitive threat to its peers, we would expect the investors of the 
competing peer firms to react negatively to such news. However, the strategic response from 
peers should relieve the pressure and weaken the negative reaction of the investors.  
We gauge peer firms’ stock market reaction to the voting firm’s increased CSR 
engagement by calculating their CARs over the three-day event window [-1, +1] around the 
voting date using a market model.22 We conduct similar RDD analysis between passing peers 
and failing peers, and the results are as reported in Table 9. Panel A shows that in general, 
product-market peers experienced significantly lower CARs. That is, the difference in CARs 
between passing peers and failing peers is negative. To confirm the result of stock market 
                                                            
22 We also validate the results based on the market model by estimations using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
and Carhart (1997) four-factor models. The results are available upon request. 
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reactions, we also examine peer firms’ changes in the product market share one year after the 
vote. Since voting firms will implement the CSR proposal in year t+1, we expect the competitive 
threats on market shares to be materialized in year t+2 (Flammer (2015a)). Therefore, we focus 
on changes in peer firms’ market share from year t+1 to year t+2. Consistent with the evidence 
from the stock market (column (1)), we find that the passing peers on average experience a 
decrease in market share relative to the failing competing peers in column (2). These results 
suggest that shareholders of competitors interpret the voting outcome as bad news, which is 
consistent with the notion that a firm’s adoption of CSR can attract a greater market share, thus 
hurting it competitors.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
Because the stock market is forward-looking, the negative effect on passing peers’ CARs 
should be stronger if these peer firms’ investors perceive their companies as being less likely to 
catch up in terms of CSR in the future. We further use four proxies to test this “lost in 
competition” prediction. First, we directly test the change in CSR difference between the voting 
firm and its peer firm after the vote. A significant increase in the CSR of the voting firm relative 
to that of its peers suggests that the vote can be regarded as “effective” in a competition 
relationship. If the voting firm was already a leader in CSR competition before the vote, the 
passage of the proposal will enlarge its competitive advantage over its peers. If the voting firm 
lags behind its peers in CSR, the passage of the proposal will reduce the gap with its peers. We 
thus partition our sample into two groups: those with a significant increase in the CSR gap (the 
voting firm’s CSR minus the peer firm’s CSR) and those without such an increase. As shown in 
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Panel B of Table 9, the negative and significant effect is present only in the subsample of peers 
that experience an increase in the gap between their CSR and their voting firms’ CSR.  
Secondly, we test the conjecture that if peer firms are more financially constrained, they 
are less likely to have the capacity to catch up by investing in CSR. We capture a peer firm’s 
financial constraint using the measure developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) (hereafter 
“HP”),23 in which a higher index value indicates greater financial constraint (in terms of the peer 
firm’s ability to catch up with respect to CSR investment). As shown in Panel C of Table 9, the 
negative effect shows up only in the subsample of high-HP peers, that is, peers with greater 
financial constraints. This is consistent with our conjecture. 
The immediate response from the market also depends on the competitive pressure on the 
peer firm and the ex ante likelihood of a CSR proposal’s being implemented as perceived by peer 
firms’ investors. The loss will translate into immediate market reaction only when the investors 
believe the pressure from competition is high and the signal of the voting firm implementing the 
passed CSR proposal is credible. Therefore, we conduct a further test by splitting the sample into 
two subgroups based on the competitive pressure of the peer firm as measured in Table 8. The 
results in Panel D of Table 9 show that only peers with high competitive pressures experience 
negative market reactions.  
Finally, we split our sample based on whether the board recommended “YES” (or “FOR”) 
to the proposal before the vote, as this is ex ante observable at the time of the vote and increases 
the likelihood of the focal firm actually implementing the proposal. We expect the peer firms’ 
                                                            
23 Several measures of financial constraints exist, but according to Hadlock and Pierce (2010) (hereafter “HP”), most 
of these suffer from too much noise from firm attributes other than size and age. Therefore, we use the financial-
constraints index developed by HP and divide our competing peer sample into two groups, one with high financial 
constraints and the other with low financial constraints. To check the robustness of this result, we conduct the same 
analysis on the subsamples partitioned by alternative measures of financial constraints, including the Whited and 
Wu (2006) index and an indicator of whether the nonvoting peer firm distributed dividends in year t-1 (Denis and 
Sibilkov (2010)). The results are similar to those using the HP index. 
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reactions to be stronger if their investors believe that the focal firms would implement the CSR 
improvement. Data on board recommendation prior to the vote are obtained from ISS US Voting 
Outcomes and are manually matched with our original CSR votes. As shown in Panel E of Table 
9, the negative market reaction shows up only in the subsample whose boards recommended 
YES to the proposal prior to the vote; this is again consistent with our conjecture. These results 
are also consistent with the empirical literature on the value-enhancing effect of CSR (e.g., 
Flammer (2015a); Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog (2016); Lins et al. (2017)) in that they show 
that one company’s gain in value by adopting CSR is its competitors’ loss in value. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Identifying the causal effect of peer effects among corporations is notoriously difficult. Equally 
difficult is identifying whether this peer effect has a social component. Existing evidence shows 
that CSR is determined largely by environmental factors (Liang and Renneboog (2017a); 
Ioannou and Serafeim (2012)). Despite the growing literature on the determinants and value 
consequences of CSR, little is known about the influence of other firms on a firm’s CSR. In this 
paper we present evidence on the peer effects of CSR using a regression discontinuity design 
approach. We rely on CSR proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes during 
shareholder meetings as a source of locally exogenous variation in CSR commitment. By 
focusing on the reactions of peer firms competing in the same product markets (Hoberg and 
Phillips (2016)) to this potential adoption of CSR, our paper provides new insight into the 
motivations for corporate engagement in social issues and sheds light on the recent phenomenon 
of the surge in CSR. 
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We find strong evidence of the adoption of CSR practices among peer firms following 
the passage of a voting firm’s CSR proposal. On average, the difference in CSR scores between 
passing peers and failing peers is 0.16 point. Stronger results are found for passed proposals that 
were actually implemented, which we call CSR peer effects. These results are robust for 
alternative samples of peers with economic links. These peer firms actively follow (more 
strengths rather than fewer concerns) and specifically (in the same domain) follow the voting 
firm’s signaled commitment to CSR. However, peers that are market followers may also adopt 
CSR in different domains in addition to mimicking the voting firm’s CSR. Such effects are not 
likely to be attributed to financial intermediaries’ propagation, as we don’t find similar results in 
samples of common analysts and common institutional investors, but rather are more consistent 
with a utility-based explanation. We further find that on the days around a shareholder meeting, a 
close-call CSR proposal is related to lower CARs in competing peers, especially those that have 
more difficulty catching up. All these results are consistent with a competition-based explanation. 
As a whole, our analysis identifies an important, yet so far unexplored, determinant of CSR 
practice and highlights the importance of strategic interaction in understanding peer effects in 
economic activity.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
Total Assets (millions US$) 38,630 7,589 11,994 715 2,273 7,941 
Market-to-Book 38,630 1.69 0.87 1.08 1.30 1.98 
Book Leverage 38,630 0.21 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.33 
ROA 37,634 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.15 
Adj. KLD Score 38,630 -0.13 0.42 -0.33 -0.14 0.13 
Adj. KLD Strengths 38,630 0.22 0.37 0.00 0.13 0.29 
Adj. KLD Concerns 38,630 0.41 0.43 0.00 0.33 0.58 
Adj. KLD Environment Score 38,630 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adj. KLD Employee Relations Score 38,630 -0.04 0.16 -0.20 0.00 0.00 
Adj. KLD Diversity Score 38,630 -0.07 0.26 -0.33 0.00 0.13 
Adj. KLD Community Score 38,630 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CAR [-1, +1] 38,630 -0.0013 0.0289 -0.0191 -0.0012 0.0170 
 
Notes. This table reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables. Based on the 1,407 unique CSR 
proposals that were being voted on, our sample consists of 38,630 unique (nonvoting) peer-vote observations 
from 3,452 unique U.S. public firms over the period 1997-2011. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 5th and 95th percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 2. Validity for CSR Vote as Regression Discontinuity Design (Preexisting Difference) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Fail Pass 
Difference                    
(Fail vs. Pass) 
Difference within 
Narrow Margin 
(Optimal 
Bandwidth) 
 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Size 37,685 7.760 945 8.160 -0.399 0.000 -0.138 0.156 
Market-to-Book 37,685 1.700 945 1.420 0.276 0.000 0.046 0.261 
Book Leverage 37,685 0.210 945 0.200 0.013 0.018 0.011 0.284 
ROA 36,706 0.080 928 0.080 0.006 0.073 0.007 0.156 
Adj. KLD Score 37,685 -0.127 945 -0.134 -0.007 0.610 -0.030 0.201 
 
Notes. This table shows differences in several observable characteristics—adjusted KLD score, firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio, and ROA—between (nonvoting) peer firms that are associated with 
the passage (“Pass”) of a CSR proposal in voting firms and those that are associated with the rejection 
(“Fail”) of a CSR proposal in voting firms by a small margin. We define the margin as the optimal 
bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).  
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Table 3. The Effect of the Passage of a Close-Call CSR Proposal on the Voting Firm 
 
Panel A. Stock Market Reaction, Subsequent CSR Engagement, and Profitability of the Voting Firm 
 
Voting firms 
 
Adj CSR Score CAR ROA 
  Pass vs. Fail Pass vs. Fail Pass vs. Fail 
Estimate 0.18*** 1.02** 0.003* 
t-stat 2.83 2.21 1.87 
 
Panel B. Implementation Rate of All Passed CSR Proposals 
 
Panel B.1. Based on increase in CSR score 
 
All CSR Proposals Environment Employee Relationship Diversity 
Implementation rate 60% 60% 50% 20% 
     
Panel B.2. Based on increase in Asset4 Score 
 
All CSR proposal Environment Employee Relationship Diversity 
Implementation rate 62.50% 100% 100% 25% 
     
Panel B.3. Based on news about implementation 
 
All CSR proposal Environment Employee Relationship Diversity 
Implementation rate 57.14% 80% 66.70% 60% 
 
Notes. Panel A reports the impact of CSR proposal passage on voting firms using RDD approach. We 
examine voting firms’ future CSR performance (year t+1), immediate market reaction, and future 
profitability (year t+2). Panel B presents the implementation rate of CSR proposals based on different 
criteria. In Panel B.1. we define implementation of an increase in adjusted CSR score from MSCI ESG 
STATS (formerly KLD database). For each dimension, implementation is defined as an increase in 
related CSR dimensions.  In Panel B.2, implementation is the increase in Asset4 score. In Panel B.3, we 
manually examine the news for passed CSR proposals and define implementation as 1) there is news 
report about the proposal implementation; or 2) there is news report on the corporate website; or 3) 
management team vote ‘For’ before the votes. 
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Table 4. Responses of Nonvoting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal: Baseline Results 
 
Panel A.  
Following-Year Response of Nonvoting Peer Firms to the Passage of a Voting Firm’s CSR Proposal 
Adj. KLD Score 
t+1 
Pass vs. Fail 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
50% of 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
150% of 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
(ΔCSR from t-1) 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Estimate 0.16*** 0.10** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 
t-stat 6.18 2.28 4.26 3.58 4.37 
Kernel Rectangular Triangular 
 
Panel B.  
Evidence from Global Polynomial Regression 
 (1) (2) 
 
Adj. KLD Score 
t+1 
Adj. KLD Score 
t+1 
   Pass 0.24*** 0.086* 
 
(0.05) (0.047) 
Constant -0.16*** -1.24*** 
 (0.03) (0.070) 
   
Polynomial Order 3 3 
Controls No Yes 
Obs. 38,630 37,634 
 
Notes. This table presents peer firms’ future CSR performance as a response to the CSR votes. Panel A 
presents RDD estimations from a local linear regression as specified in Equation (1) using the optimal 
bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). We report results across alternative bandwidths, 
including 50% of optimal bandwidth (narrower bandwidth), 50% of optimal bandwidth (narrower 
bandwidth), and 150% of optimal bandwidth (wider bandwidth). Results using both the rectangular and 
the triangular kernels are reported. Panel B shows the RDD estimations from a global polynomial 
regression. Column (1) does not include control variables, and Column (2) includes the control variables 
Size, Market-to-Book, Leverage, and ROA. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Responses of Nonvoting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal: A Fuzzy RDD 
Approach 
 
Panel A. KLD Score 
  2nd Stage 1st Stage 
Estimate 0.95*** 0.10*** 
t-stat 3.60 4.49 
 
Panel B. ASSET4 Social Pillar Score 
  2nd Stage 1st Stage 
Estimate 0.50*** 0.43*** 
t-stat 2.66 6.11 
   
Panel C. ASSET4 Environmental Pillar Score 
  2nd Stage 1st Stage 
Estimate 0.90*** 0.24*** 
t-stat 2.61 3.43 
   
Panel D. News about Implementation 
  2nd Stage 1st Stage 
Estimate 0.18*** 0.67*** 
t-stat 3.93 25.70 
 
Notes. This table presents peer firms’ future CSR implementation as a response to the CSR votes estimated 
using a fuzzy RDD approach. Specifically, the true “treatment” is a dummy variable if (1) there is an 
increase in adjusted KLD score in the year after the vote (Panel A); (2) there is an increase of more than 10 
in the ASSET4 score (the environmental pillar and the social pillar) in the year after the vote (Panel B and 
Panel C); or (3) there is news or information showing that the proposal was implemented (Panel D). The 
optimal bandwidth is determined following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Response of Nonvoting Peers to Implementation and Non-Implementation 
 
KLD Score Increase 
ASSET4 Social Pillar Score 
Increase 
ASSET4 Environmental Pillar 
Score Increase 
Corporate News 
 
Implemented Unimplemented Implemented Unimplemented Implemented Unimplemented Implemented Unimplemented 
Δ Peer CSR 0.17 0.10 0.40 -0.02 0.51 -0.03 0.27 -0.05 
Diff 0.07* 0.42*** 0.53*** 0.32*** 
t-stat 1.85 6.21 7.73 8.59 
 
Note. This table presents peer firms’ future CSR performance conditional on the compliance or implementation of the CSR proposals in the voting 
firms. We compare the change of CSR scores of the peer firms in response to the compliance of the passed CSR proposals. Four measures of 
compliance are used: (1) there is an increase in adjusted KLD score in the year after the vote; (2) there is an increase of more than 10 in the ASSET4 
Social Pillar Score in the year after the vote; (3) there is an increase of more than 10 in the ASSET4 Environmental Pillar Score in the year after the 
vote; (4) there is news or information showing that the proposal was implemented. The optimal bandwidth is determined according to Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012).  The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7. Breakdown of KLD Score 
 
Panel A. Following-Year KLD Strengths Score and Concerns Score of Nonvoting Peers 
 
Pass vs. Fail 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
Strengths Score 
 
Concerns Score 
RDD Estimate 0.07** 
 
-0.02 
t-stat 2.16 
 
-0.79 
 
Panel B. Environment-Related Proposals and Nonvoting Peers’ Following-Year KLD Subscores 
 Pass vs. Fail 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Adj. Environment Score 
Adj. Employee-Relations 
Score 
Adj. Workforce-Diversity 
Score 
RDD Estimate 0.20*** 0.02 0.12* 
t-stat 2.92 0.65 1.84 
 
Panel C. Environment-Related Proposals and Nonvoting Peers’ Following-Year KLD  Diversity Score 
 
Pass vs. Fail 
 
Defined by product 
 market share 
Defined by profitability 
(ROA) 
Defined by CSR (using 
Environmental score) 
 
Follower Leader Follower Leader Follower Leader 
RDD Estimate 0.27* 0.03 0.25* 0.17 0.49*** 0.02 
t-stat 1.92 0.35 1.82 1.07 3.89 0.14 
 
Notes. This table presents the effects of the passage of a CSR proposal on (nonvoting) peers’ following-year 
CSR performance by breaking down the KLD score into different dimensions. Panel A shows the RDD 
estimates for the adjusted KLD strengths score (column (1)) and the adjusted KLD concerns score (column 
(2)). Panel B shows the RDD estimates for three major sub-dimensional KLD scores: environment (column 
(1)), employee relations (column (2)), and workforce diversity (column (3)). Panel C shows the RDD 
estimates on (nonvoting) peers’ following-year workforce diversity scores following the passage of an 
environment-related CSR proposal conditional on whether the (nonvoting) peer is an industry follower or a 
leader (defined in different ways). In column (1), follower and leader are defined based on their market 
shares (sales revenue): a peer firm is defined as follower if its market share is lower than the voting firm’s 
market share prior to the voting, and is otherwise defined as leader. Similarly, follower and leader are 
defined by their profitability (ROA) relative to the voting firm prior to the voting in column (2), and defined 
based on their adjusted environmental score relative to the voting firm prior to the voting in column (3). We 
follow Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal 
using local linear regression with the optimal bandwidth. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Mechanisms of Peer Effects: Disentangling Propagation and Competition 
 
Panel A. Redefining Peer Firms 
 (1) (2) 
 
Common Analyst Common Institutional Investors 
Estimate 0.05 0.01 
t-stat 1.62 0.47 
   
Panel B. Peer Effects of CSR: Conditional on External Propagation  
 Common Analyst Common Institutional Investors 
 
Yes No Yes No 
 
Adj. CSR Score Adj. CSR Score Adj. CSR Score Adj. CSR Score 
 
Pass vs. Fail Pass vs. Fail Pass vs. Fail Pass vs. Fail 
Estimate 0.10** 0.08* 0.13** 0.11** 
t-stat 2.38 1.79 2.45 2.35 
 
Panel C. Peer Effects of CSR: Conditional on Competitive Pressure 
 
Pass vs. Fail 
 
High Competitive Pressure Low Competitive Pressure 
Estimate 0.17** 0.05 
t-stat 2.02 0.84 
 
Notes. This table reports RDD results disentangling propagation and competition explanations. In Panel A, 
we perform the RDD tests on samples of alternative definitions of peers using common analysts and common 
institutional investors. In Panel B, we perform the RDD tests on subsamples of product-market peers divided 
by common analysts and by common institutional investors. Common analysts (or common institutional 
investors) are a binary variable that equals 1 if two firms are covered by the same financial analyst (or held 
by the same institutional investor). In Panel C, we perform RDD tests on subsamples of product-market peers 
divided by the voting firm’s competitive pressure (high vs. low), which measures similarities between a 
change in a firm’s product space and an aggregate change in the competitors’ product description. This 
competitive pressure measure is taken from the fluidity measure as described in Hoberg, Phillips, and 
Prabhala (2014), which argues that when fluidity is greater, the firm’s products are more similar to its peers’, 
and thus the competitive threat is greater. We follow Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the 
effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal using local linear regression with the optimal bandwidth. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Value Implications of CSR Peer Effects 
Panel A. Value Implications of Product Peers 
 
Pass vs. Fail Pass vs. Fail 
 
CAR [-1, +1] ∆Market Share [t+1, t+2] 
RDD Estimate -0.58%*** -0.09%*** 
t-stat -4.11 -2.94 
   
Panel B. CSR Gap (voting firm – peer firm) 
 
Pass vs. Fail 
 
Increase No Increase 
RDD Estimate CAR [-1, +1] -0.51%*** 0.01% 
t-stat -3.06 0.07 
   
Panel C. Financial Constraints 
 
Pass vs. Fail 
 
High Low 
RDD Estimate CAR [-1, +1] -0.54%** -0.17% 
t-stat -2.38 -1.24 
   
Panel D. Competitive Pressure 
 
Pass vs. Fail 
 
High Low 
RDD Estimate CAR [-1, +1] -1.33%*** -0.29% 
t-stat -5.48 -0.6 
   
Panel E. Board Recommendations 
 
Pass vs. Fail 
 
For (not against) Against 
RDD Estimate CAR [-1, +1] -0.93%*** -0.13% 
t-stat -4.72 -1.07 
 
Notes. This table reports the RDD estimates of peer firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on the 
sample of product-market peers. Panel A reports the results for three-day CARs around the CSR vote and the 
one-year-later change in product-market shares for the overall sample. We measure the threat of competition 
by classifying sample firms based on (1) whether the CSR gap between the voting firm and its peer firms is 
further enlarged after the passage of a CSR proposal (Panel B); (2) whether the level of financial constraints 
of competing peers is high or low (using Hadlock and Pierce (2010), Panel C); (3) competitive pressure 
between the voting firm and peer firms (Panel D); and (4) whether voting firms’ board vote ‘For’ for the 
CSR proposal (ex-ante probability of implementing the proposal, Panel E). We follow Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal using local linear 
regression with the optimal bandwidth. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B.  The symbols *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Examples of Close-Call CSR Proposals and Peer Firms’ Reactions 
 
Panel A. 
Example of a Marginally Rejected CSR 
Proposal 
 
Panel B. 
Example of a Marginally Approved CSR 
Proposal 
Company Name Massey Energy Company 
 
IDACORP, Inc 
Company 
Description 
The company produces, processes, and sells 
bituminous coal of various steam and 
metallurgical grades, primarily of a low 
sulfur content, through its 25 processing 
and shipping centers (Resource Groups), 
many of which receive coal from multiple 
mines. 
 
The company’s principal operating 
subsidiary is Idaho Power Company, an 
electric utility engaged in the generation, 
transmission, distribution, sale, and 
purchase of electric energy. Its other 
subsidiaries include IDACORP Financial 
Services and Ida-West Energy Company, 
among others 
Stock Ticker NYSE: MEE  NYSE: IDA 
Date of Vote 19 May 2009 
 
21 May 2009 
Proposal Type Environmental Issue  Environmental Issue 
Proposal Contents 
 
Shareholders request a special report, to be 
reviewed by a board committee of 
independent directors, on how the company 
is responding to rising regulatory and 
public pressure to significantly reduce the 
social and environmental harm associated 
with carbon dioxide emissions from the 
company’s operations and from the use of 
its primary products. The report should be 
provided by 1 November 2009 at a 
reasonable cost and omit proprietary 
information. 
 
 
 
 
Shareholders request that the board of 
directors adopt quantitative goals—based 
on current technologies—of reducing 
total greenhouse-gas emissions from the 
company’s products and operations; and 
that the company report to shareholders 
by 30 September 2009 on its plans to 
achieve these goals. Such a report will 
omit proprietary information and be 
prepared at reasonable cost. 
Voting Results Rejected (45.6% of the votes) 
 
Passed (51.2% of the votes) 
    
 Competing Peer Firms’ Reaction  Competing Peer Firms’ Reaction 
All Peers 
No. of peers 
Average Adj. CSR 
Score in Year t+1 
 No. of peers 
Average Adj. CSR 
Score in Year t+1 
49 -0.62  55 -0.20 
One Randomly 
Selected Peer 
Peer Name 
Adj. CSR Score in 
Year t+1 
 Peer Name 
Adj. CSR Score in 
Year t+1 
Marathon Oil -0.75  
Northwest Natural 
Gas 
0.25 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
Firm Size Logarithm of total assets (item 6) of a firm. Source: Compustat. 
Market-to-Book 
Market value of assets over book value of assets: (item 6 (total assets) - item 60 (common equity) + 
item 25 (common share outstanding) × item 199 (fiscal year–end stock price)) / item 6 (total assets). 
Source: Compustat. 
Book Leverage 
Book leverage: All debt (item 9 (long-term debt) + item 34 (short-term debt)) / total assets (item 6). 
Source: Compustat. 
Market Leverage 
Market leverage: All debt (item 9 + item 34) / market value of total assets (item 6 - item 60 + item 25 
× item 199). Source: Compustat 
ROA 
ROA is calculated as (item 13 (operating income before depreciation) / item 6 (total assets)). Source: 
Compustat. 
Cash Flow/Total 
Assets 
Operating cash flow before extraordinary items (item 123) scaled by total assets (item 6). Source: 
Compustat 
Adj. KLD Score 
The sum of yearly adjusted community activities, diversity, employee relations, and environmental 
record KLD CSR Scores. Adjusted CSR is estimated by scaling the raw strength and concern scores 
of each category by the number of items of strength and concerns of that category in the year and 
then taking the net difference between adjusted strengths and concerns scores for that category. 
Source: KLD (MSCI ESG STAT) Database. 
Adj. KLD 
Strengths 
The sum of yearly adjusted community activities, diversity, employee relations, and environmental 
record KLD STATS CSR Strengths Scores. Source: KLD (MSCI ESG STAT) Database. 
Adj. KLD 
Concerns 
The sum of yearly adjusted community activities, diversity, employee relations, and environmental 
record KLD STATS CSR Concerns Scores. Source: KLD (MSCI ESG STAT) Database. 
Adj. KLD 
Environmental 
Score 
Adjusted environmental record KLD STATS CSR Score, calculated by scaling the raw 
environmental strengths and concerns scores by the number of items of environmental strengths and 
concerns in the year and then taking the net difference between adjusted strengths and concerns. 
Source: KLD (MSCI ESG STAT) Database. 
Adj. KLD 
Employee 
Relations Score 
Adjusted employee relationship record KLD STATS CSR Score, calculated by scaling the raw 
employee strengths and concerns scores by the number of items of employee strengths and concerns 
in the year and then taking the net difference between adjusted strengths and concerns. Source: KLD 
(MSCI ESG STAT) Database. 
Adj. KLD 
Diversity Score 
Adjusted diversity record KLD STATS CSR Score, calculated by scaling the raw diversity strengths 
and concerns scores by the number of items of diversity strengths and concerns in the year and then 
taking the net difference between adjusted strengths and concerns. Source: KLD (MSCI ESG STAT) 
Database. 
Adj. KLD 
Community 
Score 
Adjusted community record KLD STATS CSR Score, calculated by scaling the raw community 
strengths and concerns scores by the number of items of community strengths and concerns in the 
year and then taking the net difference between adjusted strengths and concerns. Source: KLD 
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(MSCI ESG STAT) Database. 
ASSET4 Social 
Pillar Score 
The ASSET4 Social Pillar score measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty in its 
workforce, customers, and society, through (SOCSCORE) and its use of best management practices. 
It is a reflection of the company’s reputation and the health of its license to operate, which are key 
factors in determining its ability to generate long-term shareholder value. The social pillar is an 
equally weighted score of the sub-dimensional scores: Customer/Product Responsibility, 
Society/Human Rights, Workforce/Diversity and Opportunity, Workforce/Employment Quality, 
Workforce/Health & Safety, Workforce/Training & Development. The score ranges from 0 to 100, 
with higher score indicating better performance in this dimension. Source: Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 database. 
ASSET4 
Environmental 
Pillar Score 
The ASSET4 Environmental Pillar score measures a company’s impact on living and nonliving 
natural systems, including air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a 
company uses best management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on 
environmental opportunities in order to generate long-term shareholder value. The environmental 
pillar is an equally weighted score of the sub-dimensional scores Emission Reduction, Product 
Innovation, and Resource Reduction. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with higher score indicating 
better performance in this dimension. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
Environmental 
R&D Score 
The ASSET4 Environmental R&D Score measures whether the company invest in R&D on new 
environmentally friendly products or services that will limit the amounts of emissions and resources 
needed during product use. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with higher score indicating better 
performance in this dimension. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
Renewable/Clean 
Energy Products 
Score 
The ASSET4 Renewable/Clean Energy Products Score measures whether the company develops 
products or technologies for use in producing clean, renewable energy (such as wind, solar, hydro, 
geo-thermal, and biomass power). The score ranges from 0 to 100, with higher score indicating better 
performance in this dimension.  Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
Report on 
biodiversity 
impact 
A dummy variable indicating whether the company reported on its impact on biodiversity, on 
activities to reduce its impact on native ecosystems and species, and on the biodiversity of protected 
and sensitive areas. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
Restoring 
ecosystems 
A dummy variable indicating whether the company took any initiative to restore or protect native 
ecosystems or the biodiversity of protected and sensitive areas. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 
database. 
Environmental 
investment 
initiative 
A dummy variable indicating whether the company report made proactive environmental 
investments or expenditures. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
Environmental 
R&Ds 
A dummy indicating whether the company invested in R&D on new environmentally friendly 
products. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
Environmental 
training on 
employees 
A dummy variable indicating whether the company trained its employees on environmental issues. 
Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
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Competitive 
Pressure 
The Competitive Pressure is proxied by the fluidity measure as defined in Hoberg, Phllips, and 
Prabhala (2014), which is a “cosine” similarity between a firm’s products and changes in the peers’ 
products and is scaled between 0 and 1. Higher fluidity indicates greater product-market threats. 
Details are in Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014). 
Relative CSR 
Performance 
The gap in adjusted KLD scores between nonvoting and voting firms in the year before the vote. 
Source: KLD (MSCI ESG STAT) Database. 
Financial 
Constraints 
(Hadlock-Pierce 
Index) 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) financial constraint index, with higher value indicating more financial 
constraint: 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = −0.737 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 − 0.043 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖2 − 0.040 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖. Source: Compustat. 
Market Shares Proportion of a firm’s sales revenue in its text-based peer industry. Source: Compustat. 
Common 
Analysts 
A dummy equals 1 if the voting firm and its peer firm are covered by the same financial analyst. 
Source: I/B/E/S. 
Common 
Institutional 
Investors 
A dummy equals 1 if the voting firm and its peer firms are held by the same institutional investors. 
Source: CDA/Spectrum Institutional 13(f) filings. 
Board 
Recommendation 
Board Recommendation” (MgmtRec) refers to the Board of Directors vote recommendations (For or 
Against) on a proposal disclosed in proxy card. Source: ISS US Voting Outcomes. 
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Appendix C. Sample Distribution of CSR Proposals 
Panel A. Distribution of Events across Years 
Year No. of Votes 
No. of 
Nonvoting Peers 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1997 60 690 1.79% 
1998 61 686 3.56% 
1999 50 584 5.07% 
2000 82 1,031 7.74% 
2001 82 1,015 10.37% 
2002 89 1,330 13.81% 
2003 86 2,980 21.53% 
2004 106 3,640 30.95% 
2005 108 3,712 40.56% 
2006 115 3,886 50.62% 
2007 112 3,760 60.35% 
2008 112 3,778 70.13% 
2009 122 3,860 80.12% 
2010 120 3,894 90.20% 
2011 102 3,784 100.00% 
Total 1,407 38,630 
 
 
 
 
  Panel B. Distribution of Events across Proposal Types 
Type No. of Votes 
No. of 
Nonvoting Peers 
Percentage 
Community 84 2,592 6.71% 
Corporate Governance 59 3,367 8.72% 
Diversity 185 3,586 9.28% 
Employee Relations 204 3,765 9.75% 
Environment 431 10,809 27.98% 
Human Rights 95 2,941 7.61% 
Others (Alcohol, Military, Nuclear, Tobacco) 73 939 2.43% 
General Social Responsibility Issues 276 10,631 27.52% 
Total 1,407 38,630 100% 
 
Notes. This table presents the distributions of CSR proposals and of the affected nonvoting peers. Panel A 
reports the sample distribution by year, and Panel B reports the sample distribution by type of CSR proposal. 
Our sample contains 1,407 unique CSR votes retrieved from the RiskMetrics and SharkRepellent databases 
over the period of 1997–2011. We obtain nonvoting peers from Hoberg-Phillips industry classifications 
based on firm pairwise similarity scores from text analysis of firm 10-K product descriptions. Our sample 
contains 38,630 unique (nonvoting) peer-vote observations that correspond to 3,452 unique U.S. public firms. 
The jump in the number of peer-vote observations from 2002 (1,330) to 2003 (2,980) is due to the change in 
coverage in the KLD database. The KLD database covered 1,128 unique firms in 2002 and 2,978 unique 
firms in 2003.  
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Appendix D.1. Distribution of Nonvoting Peers against the Percentage of CSR Votes  
 
 
Notes. This figure plots the histogram of the percentage of nonvoting peer firms in our sample per voting 
share interval (each interval represents 5% of voting shares). Our sample contains 1,407 unique CSR votes 
retrieved from the RiskMetrics and SharkRepellent databases from 1997 to 2011. We obtain nonvoting peers 
from Hoberg-Phillips industry classifications based on firm pairwise similarity scores from the textual 
analysis of firm 10-K product descriptions. Our sample contains 38,630 unique (nonvoting) peer votes from 
3,452 unique U.S. public firms (nonvoting peer). 
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Appendix D.2. Density of CSR Vote Shares 
 
 
Notes. This figure plots the density of CSR vote shares following the procedure in McCrary (2008). The x- 
axis is the distance (in percentage of votes) from the majority threshold of passing a proposal. The dots 
depict the density estimate. The solid line represents the fitted density function of the forcing variable 
(number of votes).   
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Appendix E: More Pre-existing Difference Test 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Fail Pass 
Difference                    
(Fail vs. Pass) 
Difference within 
Narrow Margin 
(Optimal 
Bandwidth) 
 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Market Leverage 37,685 0.156 945 0.164 0.008 0.089 0.010 0.191 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 36,004 0.035 898 0.049 0.014 0.021 -0.012 0.157 
Adj. Environment Score 37,685 -0.011 945 -0.002 0.009 0.029 0.007 0.411 
Adj. Employee Score 37,685 -0.044 945 -0.021 0.024 0.000 -0.001 0.883 
Adj. Community Score 37,685 -0.004 945 -0.019 -0.015 0.035 -0.012 0.371 
Adj. Diversity Score 37,685 -0.068 945 -0.088 -0.020 0.050 0.006 0.404 
 
Notes. This table shows differences in several observable characteristics—adjusted KLD score, firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio, and ROA—between (nonvoting) peer firms that are associated with the 
passage (“Pass”) of a CSR proposal in voting firms and those that are associated with the rejection (“Fail”) of 
a CSR proposal in voting firms by a small margin. We define the margin as the optimal bandwidth following 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).  
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Appendix F: Robustness 
 
 
  
Panel A. RDD Estimation on Actual CSR (Environmental) Practices of Peer Firms 
 
Panel A.1  
Voting Firm’s Passage of Any 
CSR Proposal 
Panel A.2 
Voting Firm’s Passage of An 
Environmental Proposal 
 
RDD estimates t-stat RDD estimates t-stat 
Report on biodiversity impact 0.29*** 4.16 0.55*** 5.35 
Restoring ecosystems 0.23** 2.37 0.87*** 7.81 
Environmental investment initiative 0.38*** 4.74 0.57*** 9.12 
Environmental R&Ds 0.13*** 1.98 0.17*** 4.16 
Environmental training on employees 0.30*** 3.11 0.79*** 7.91 
Environmental R&D Score (ASSET4) 11.09* 1.78 15.16*** 5.08 
Renewable/Clean Energy Products 
Score (ASSET4) 
4.86* 1.72 20.46*** 3.33 
 
Panel B. Alternative Product-Market Peer Classification 
 (1) 3-Digit SIC Peers (2) 50 Arbitrarily Chosen Peers 
 Pass vs. Fail 
Estimate 0.25*** 0.12** 
t-stat 6.77 2.26 
 
Panel C. Placebo Tests 
 (1) Response from  Nonpeers 
(2) Excluding Corporate Governance 
Proposals 
 Pass vs. Fail 
Estimate -0.03 0.13*** 
t-stat -0.98 2.77 
 
Notes. This table presents the RDD estimates using alternative CSR measures and peer-firm samples. We 
follow Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal 
using local linear regression with the optimal bandwidth. In Panel A, we examine peer firms’ specific CSR 
actions using Asset4 database. In Panel B, we redefine peer firms. Panel B (1) reports the response from 
peers in the same 3-digit SIC industries (104,083 nonvoting firm-vote observations). In Panel B (2) we 
arbitrarily assign a maximum of 50 nonvoting peers for each voting firm and randomly select its peer firms 
from the pool of all its nonvoting peers into the sample. In Panel C (1), we conduct placebo test using a 
matched non-peer sample. Specifically, for each peer firm we find a matched nonpeer firm based on firm size, 
market-to-book, and leverage. Panel C (2) represents a control created by excluding all proposals on 
corporate governance. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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